

The background features a dark blue gradient with a subtle pattern of white dots. On the left side, there are several overlapping circular elements. A prominent one is a large circle with a scale around its perimeter, marked with numbers from 140 to 260 in increments of 10. Other circles are partially visible, some with dashed lines and arrows, suggesting a complex, interconnected system or data flow.

GLOBAL SYSTEMIC RISK

COLLOQUIUM ON SYSTEMIC RISK
OCTOBER 27, 2022

AGENDA

Motivation

Systems and Networks

Global Systemic Risk

Mechanisms of Risk


Ukraine War as GSR

Governance Solutions?


MOTIVATION




SMARTPHONE USERS: UP 800




Life expectancy globally and by world regions since 1770



WE ARE TORN BETWEEN
PLENTY AND....



(click on line/label for focus)



...AND ANXIETY

AND THEN.....POLYCRISIS



HUBRIS



WHAT IS GSR?





RISK.PRINCETON.EDU

- Peter Callahan
- Miguel Centeno
- Paul Larcey
- Thayer Patterson

GLOBAL SYSTEMIC RISK

The global system is the set of tightly coupled interactions that together allow for the continued flow of information, money, goods, services, and people.

Though these connections are not in themselves new, the level of interdependence, the tight couplings between many of these domains, and the speed and scale of interactions have created new configurations of opportunity and risk.

We investigate the causes and consequences of global systemic risk (GSR) through the analysis of human-made networks and the robustness or fragility of these structures to endogenous forces and exogenous shocks.

Investigate the theoretical and methodological approaches to analyzing the construction and dynamics of complex systems and their inherent robustness and fragility.

COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

Complex adaptive systems arise endogenously out of the interactions of components, and have collective behaviors that cannot be reduced to those of their components

The complex interactions of components create new dynamics that cannot be explained solely by the behavior of constituents, whether intended or not

Such systems can often give the appearance of stability even as their fragility increases

This fragility is due to the fact that complex systems may gradually become susceptible to small perturbations that have catastrophic results.

GLOBALIZATION AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM

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Modern systems are built to exploit the benefits and efficiencies resulting from specialization of labor, economies of scale, collective knowledge and information sharing.

These same systems that underwrite our way of life also create expose us to catastrophic outcomes that may derive from the characteristics of the relationships themselves.

EDGE OF CHAOS

Systems that reach this threshold at the “edge of chaos” are particularly prone to sudden, nonlinear transitions from one state to another.

Such critical transitions can be the result of either external perturbations or the endogenous functioning of the system itself, and are both difficult to forecast and potentially irreversible

Systems that are both complex and densely interconnected are especially prone to “complexity catastrophe”

SYSTEMIC AND EMERGENT RISK

- Systemic risk is risk to the “system” that is posed by the interconnections or network of its constituent parts.
 - About connections, cascades and thresholds; it is about how local risk scales up to and develops as global risk.
- Emergent risk arises from how individual parts are connected to form the whole, but – and this is the distinguishing point from systemic risk – *it is not reducible to the individual components.*



SYSTEMIC RISKS AND COLLAPSE

We define “**systemic risk**” as the risk that a given system will experience a systemic collapse, driven primarily by endogenous forces, such that it can no longer fulfill its critical function through damage that is not easily undone.



A **systemic collapse** has taken place when 1) an event critically impairs the system’s ability to perform its core function, 2) the collapse demonstrates hysteresis, and 3) although potentially triggered by an external shock, the main cause of the systemic collapse is endogenous systemic factors.

The background features a dark blue to purple gradient with several concentric circular patterns. Some circles are solid, while others are dashed. Numbers ranging from 140 to 260 are scattered around the circles, suggesting a scale or measurement. The overall aesthetic is technical and futuristic.

NO EXIT

CAS may also provide a heuristic for the new level analysis required by a globalized world.

We are living with a new and unprecedented level of aggregation of social space.

The sheer quantity and breadth of interactions may require a shift in our analysis of interdependence.

Such interdependence has produce a myriad of benefits, but potential instability may be an endogenous characteristic of a system as complex as what we have created.

Not enough time for “market solutions”

EFFICIENCY VS. FRAGILITY

- An increasing emphasis on efficiency in these global systems has given rise to advances like just-in-time inventory and the elimination of redundancy, which has increased productivity and enabled tremendous gains in the profitability of these systems worldwide.
- These changes, however, make the systems operate at tighter tolerances with increasing dependence on technology, which makes them less resilient and heightens the potential of a costly systemic event.




MECHANISMS OF GSR



NORMAL ACCIDENTS


- Inherent unpredictability of complex and tightly coupled interactions

Living with High-Risk Technologies



BLACK SWANS

- With any event there are “tails” to the probability distribution that make the non-probable possible.
- The number and complexity of transactions and interactions makes any kind of conventional description or analysis arguably impossible to compute or comprehend. Mathematical combinatorics shows us that with just 100 agents or actors in a system, there are 2^{100} (1.3×10^{30}) possible combinations or groups of these agents, there are 100-factorial (9.3×10^{157}) possible ways for 100 agents to be ranked or ordered, and as you linearly increase a system with n agents by adding one more agent, the number of pairwise links in the system increases by n —the larger the system, the faster its potential complexity grows with each additional element.



The Impact of the
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE


EXOGENOUS

- ▶ Conquest
- ▶ Disease
- ▶ Climate shift (not self induced)
- ▶ Alien lizards
- ▶ Bad luck



ENDOGENOUS


- Loss of legitimacy
- Unsustainable inequality
- Elite splits
- Normal accident
- Emergent properties
- Hyperbolic discounting
- Overuse of resources
- Fear itself?




The real reason dinosaurs became extinct

INTERACTION EFFECTS


- *"The most interesting causes of collapse may not be the specific factors that initiate the process, but the structure that allows perturbation to amplify through the system."*




TIPPING POINTS




FEEDBACK LOOPS



CASCADE FAILURE




CONTAGION




4 ... That Could Unfold Quickly ...

SYNCHRONOUS FAILURE




CYCLES



TECHNOLOGY



LEGITIMACY



UKRAINE AND GSR




NOT A NEW ISSUE



UKRAINE AND FLOWS


ENERGY AVAILABILITY



Sources: Energy Intelligence Unit (EIU), Global Energy Review 2022

UKRAINE AND FLOWS


OIL PRICES



UKRAINE AND FLOWS

COOKING OIL

Change in price of edible oils over the past year*




*As of March 30

Source: Mintec

UKRAINE AND FLOWS

- COOKING OIL



UKRAINE AND FLOWS

CEREALS

Wheat, maize, barley and rice price indexes

100 = price at February 1, 2022



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FERTILIZER

Fertiliser prices hit new highs

CRU Fertiliser price index (Jan 2006=100)



Source: CRU
© FT

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PEOPLE



UKRAINE AND FLOWS

MONEY

20 rubles per U.S. dollar



How Much a Ruble Is Worth

Note: Scale is inverted to show the decline in the ruble's value.

As of 2:30 p.m. ET

UKRAINE AND STRUCTURES

BORDERS



UKRAINE AND STRUCTURES

ENVIRONMENT



UKRAINE AND STRUCTURES

RADIATION



THE ULTIMATE DANGER



HOW TO GOVERN WITH GSR



DEFINING THE PROBLEM I: EFFICIENCY VS. FRAGILITY

Institutional and
systemic bias

- Growth and efficiency

Optimization of
operating systems

- Just in time

Complexity of
interactions

- Emergence

Reliance on non-
sustainable
resources

- Climate change will bring
more instability

DEFINING THE PROBLEM II: GLOBAL VS. TERRITORY





DEFINING THE PROBLEM: WE ARE WHO WE ARE

- Selfish
- Opportunism (“self seeking behavior with guile”)
- Bounded Rationality
- Biases
- Mystery of collective behavior



STRATEGY I: WALLS VS. RESERVES






Figure 1. Hypothetical, abstract representation of possible responses of a physiological system to a clinical stressor. The solid circle represents the state of a physiological system. (a) Under small perturbations, the system establishes homeostasis and is stable. When perturbed by a stressor of sufficiently large magnitude, the system is displaced from its original state and establishes another equilibrium state. (b) **The system is robust when it maintains its functionality intact under the new equilibrium.** (c) The system is **resilient when it maintains its essential functionality under the new equilibrium.** (d) The system **is nonresilient when it loses its essential functionality under the new equilibrium.**

STRATEGY II: WHOM TO GOVERN



STRATEGY III: DEFINING WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES




OSTROM'S LAW:

- “A resource arrangement that works in practice can work in theory”
- Self organized governance
- Trust and (enforced) reciprocity



GETTING IT RIGHT?



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